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Abstract—To address the demand of exponentially increasing
end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this,
spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and
unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the temporal and
spatial traffic variations in the wireless network. In this paper,
we consider multiple operator spectrum allocation problem via
auctions. The classical Vickrey-Clarke-Grooves (VCG) approach
provides a strategy-proof and social welfare maximizing auction
at the cost of high computational complexity which makes it
intractable for practical implementation. We propose a sealed
bid auction for spectrum allocation, which is computationally
tractable and can hence be applied as per the dynamic load
variations of the network. We show that the proposed algorithm
is strategy-proof. Simulation results are presented to exhibit the
performance comparison of the proposed algorithm and the VCG
mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
The telecom market has been growing steadily since the
past few decades. Based on studies by the Ericsson Mobility
Report, 98 million new mobile subscriptions were reported
globally in the first quarter of 2017 [1]. It is also predicted that
the number of cellular Internet of Things (IoT) connections
is expected to reach 3.5 billion by 2023 with Long Term
Evolution (LTE) constituting major chunk of the market. To
fulfill the requirements of the exponentially increasing end
users, additional spectrum is needed. This also requires more
base station deployment in the region. However, it is well
known that the wireless spectrum is a scarce and limited
resource.
Traditionally, the spectrum is allocated for large period
of time (one or more years) to the service providers using
auctions. The operators demand spectrum as per the peak
time requirement of the network. This leads to inefficient
usage of the scarce spectrum resources as it has been observed
that most of the time full spectrum chunk is not in use. To
overcome the inefficient spectrum usage in LTE cellular bands
or below 1GHz, allocation should be done as per the spatial
and temporal traffic conditions of the network. For this, a
computationally efficient spectrum allocation mechanism is
required which can be implemented on the fly for dynamic
load variations in the network. In our work, we focus on
spectrum allocation mechanism among multiple operators via
a computationally efficient auction.
Spectrum allocation among the service providers is com-
monly performed using a sealed bid auction format. In sealed
bid auctions, each service provider sends the demand along
with the price valuation in a closed envelope to the auctioneer.
This ensures that the information of its demand and the
private valuation is not known to other service providers or
participants of the auction. However, in auctions, strategy-
proofness [2] is a major concern. Strategy-proofness implies
that the participants in the auction should not gain by deviating
from its true valuation. In other words, one should not gain
by mis-reporting about one’s valuation or demand. In general,
the objective behind the spectrum auctions is social-welfare
maximization instead of revenue maximization. Social-welfare
maximization ensures that spectrum is allocated to those who
value it most due to limited availability. Ideally, in spectrum
auction mechanisms one may want an algorithm that satisfies
three properties: strategy-proofness, social-welfare maximiza-
tion and computational feasibility. Vickrey-Clarke-Grooves
(VCG) [3]–[5] is one algorithm for spectrum allocation that
satisfies strategy-proofness and provides optimal social welfare
but it is not computationally efficient.
The reason behind the emphasis on the strategy-proof prop-
erty in the auctions is to make the process of resource allo-
cation easier for the auctioneer as well as for the participants.
It removes the time and computational overhead involved in
strategy making for the optimal bid value determination from
the user’s perspective as bidding at true valuation is always
the dominant strategy. This ensures bidding at true valuation
will always lead to the maximum utility gain. This encour-
ages more participants in the auction. From the auctioneer’s
perspective more participants and true bidding would help to
achieve better revenue in the auction. This is also beneficial
in terms of conducting the repeated auctions of short duration,
with the elimination of time overhead caused to strategize the
mechanism to manipulate the market to gain the utility with
respect to other bidders in the auction.
Current approaches [6] [7] in spectrum allocation assume
one base station per operator. However, in any real scenario
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multiple operators provide services using multiple base sta-
tions deployed (distributed) across the region. Here, spectrum
valuation varies across the base stations individually for an
operator depending on traffic conditions of the location of
the base station. Therefore, valuation of an operator in the
region depends on the set of base stations of the operator who
are allocated channels. Thus, the spectrum allocation among
the base stations of the multiple operators becomes a multi-
parameter environment problem.
In our work, we propose an algorithm which achieves
strategy-proofness and is computationally feasible at the cost
of optimal social welfare. Thanks to its computational effi-
ciency, the algorithm can also be used for real time spectrum
allocation. Unlike previous approaches, our algorithm allows
multiple operators with multiple base stations.
A. Related Work
In [6] authors propose a sealed bid auction strategy-proof
mechanism which follows monotonicity, i.e, if a base station
is allocated channel at bid value b, then it would also get
channel at any bid value b′ ≥ b, provided bid values of
other base stations are kept constant. SMALL [7] is another
mechanism which shows improvement in allocation efficiency
than the algorithm proposed in [6], though some winners are
‘sacrificed’to ensure the strategy-proofness of algorithm. In
[8] authors propose an approach for fine grained allocation
of channel (where a channel is further sliced into smaller
frequencies), but it does not satisfy the strategy-proof crite-
ria. To address the interference issue in spectrum allocation,
auction based power allocation mechanism has been proposed
in [9], which fail to be incentive compatible. In [10], authors
proposed algorithm based on greedy graph coloring approach
for spectrum allocation that maximizes the revenue of the
auction.
The algorithms proposed in [6], [7] are restricted to one
base station per operator, i.e., each base station individually
acts as a player in the auction whereas in our work we have
considered a multi-parameter environment among the multiple
base stations of the operators. In our work, non co-operative
behavior of operators is also considered which holds as per
the practical scenarios.
B. Contributions
Our contributions in the work are as follows:
• We study the spectrum allocation among multiple base
stations of multiple operators in a multi-parameter envi-
ronment, which has not been addressed in the literature
so far.
• We propose a strategy-proof spectrum allocation mech-
anism in the multi-parameter environment based on the
sealed bid auction format where strategy-proofness holds
for a vector of bids corresponding to an operator.
• We perform a comparison of computational complexity
between the proposed algorithm and the VCG algorithm
and observe that the proposed algorithm is tractable for
large number of base stations. Thus, the algorithm is
practically feasible for real time allocation of spectrum.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the system model along with the problem formulation.
In Section III, we propose the mechanism design. In Section
IV, computational complexity of the proposed algorithm is
investigated in comparison to VCG. In Section V, we present
the simulation results. In Section VI, we conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we discuss the system model for spec-
trum allocation among the multiple operators which provide
services in a geographical region. System model comprises
of a spectrum database, auctioneer, controllers and base sta-
tions. The spectrum database contains information about the
spectrum chunk available for allocation in the region. The
spectrum chunk is further divided into orthogonal channels
(non-overlapping frequency band) for auction. Auctioneer is
responsible for channel allocation among the base stations
of the operators and also takes decision about the prices to
be charged from the operator for providing right to use a
channel at the particular base station. The role of auctioneer
is to come up with a strategy for allocation of the channel.
Each operator owns a controller, which is responsible for the
calculation of demand (number of channels) as well as the
valuation (price willing to pay in case allocated) at each base
station of the operator individually and communicates these to
the auctioneer.
Fig. 1: System model
Spectrum allocation model among the base stations of two
operators in a given region is illustrated in Figure 1. The
operators 1 and 2 having 2 and 3 base stations, respectively
are deployed. Unlike the existing work in which individual
base stations act as bidders, in our system model an operator
acts as a bidder for the set of base stations associated with
itself. Since an operator acts as an agent for its base stations, it
communicates a vector of bids (valuation) to the auctioneer via
the controller. The valuation of a channel at each base station
may be different. Valuation at each base station indicates the
price that an operator is willing to pay in return of getting the
‘right to use’a channel at the particular base station. Therefore,
for different sets of base stations an operator has different
valuations, which qualifies the problem of spectrum allocation
as multi-parameter environment problem [11].
We make the following assumptions:
1) We assume that an auctioneer has the knowledge of
the topology in the geographical region. Therefore, the
overall conflict graph consisting of all the base stations
participating in the auction is available to the auctioneer.
2) We assume all channels are homogeneous in character-
istics and act as substitutes. Thus, the bid valuation is
channel independent.
3) For simplicity, we assume that the base stations that
belong to the same operator do not conflict with each
other. Hence, any base station of an operator would
experience interference only from the base stations of
other operators in the region.
We capture the interference among the base stations of
the operators with the help of a graph G = (V, E), that is
obtained from the knowledge of topology in the geographical
region, where V represents the set of vertices (nodes), and E
represents the set of edges in the graph. The set of vertices in
the graph correspond to the base stations of various operators
in the region. Any two base stations are said to interfere
with each other, if the geographical distance between them
is less than a predetermined value d. In this case, there is an
edge between them in the graph. Two interfering base stations
(nodes) can not be assigned same channel concurrently.
A. Strategy-Proof Auctions
Spectrum auctions are different from the conventional auc-
tions as the same channel can be reallocated after certain
distance depending on the interference criteria. This further
introduces challenges in the spectrum auctions in achieving
strategy-proof auction. In conventional auctions (where an
object can be provided to only one bidder), second price
auction mechanism ensures strategy-proof auction. In a second
price auction, bidders are arranged in the decreasing order of
their bids, and the highest bidder gets the resources at the
valuation of the second highest bidder in the list. However,
in spectrum auctions, the second price auction mechanism no
longer remains truthful [6]. Strategy-proof spectrum allocation
among the multiple operators with multiple base stations
becomes more challenging in the auctions. All base stations
associated with an operator may not be causing interference
to all the base stations of the other operators in the region,
then charging the second highest valuation from the highest
bidding operator in the list of operator valuations does not
consider the interference criteria.
VCG is another mechanism which always remains truthful
by selecting the optimal outcome i.e., it chooses the winner
set that maximizes the valuation of the auction. But, the
pricing mechanism involves high computational complexity to
achieve the strategy-proofness in the auction. This makes the
VCG mechanism intractable for channel allocation in spectrum
auctions with large set of base stations.
In the Section III, we propose a computationally efficient
and strategy-proof auction mechanism for spectrum alloca-
tion among the multiple operators. The proposed algorithm
assumes only one channel is available for auction across base
stations of the multiple operators providing service in the
region. This mechanism can be further extended in case of
multiple channel availability.
B. Notations and Definitions
We introduce the following notations:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} represents the set of operators partici-
pating in the spectrum auction in the geographical region.
• mi represents the number of base stations corresponding
to an operator i.
• Si = {Si1, Si2, . . . , Simi} represents the set of base stations
of an operator i.
• vij represents the true valuation of Sij i.e, j
th base station
corresponding to an operator i .
• ~vi = {vi1, vi2, . . . vimi} represents the vector of true
valuation at base stations for operator i.
• bij represents the bid of Sij i.e, j
th base station corre-
sponding to an operator i.
• ~bi = {bi1, bi2, . . . bimi} represents the vector of bids for
operator i.
• Ni represents the set of neighboring base stations which
are in conflict with the base stations of operator i, such
that the same channel cannot be shared simultaneously.
• Xi represents the binary allocation vector corresponding
to operator i, where 1 represents channel allocation.
• Xi(j) represents the jth component of Xi vector.
• Oi represents operators that are in neighbors of i i.e.
({operators j | Sj
⋂Ni 6= φ, j 6= i}).
• di = {di1, di2, . . . , dimi} represents the number of chan-
nels required at base stations of operator i.
• N(G′) represents the set of active operators from the
conflict graph G′ .
1) True valuation (σvi ) : True valuation σ
v
i of any operator
i is defined as the sum of the actual valuations (actual
valuations are private and not known to the auctioneer)
of all the base stations corresponding to the operator i.
σvi =
mi∑
j=1
vij . (1)
2) Bidding valuation (σbi ) : Bidding valuation σ
b
i of any
operator i is defined as the sum of the bids (which may
or may not be same as the actual valuation) of all the
base stations corresponding to the operator i.
σbi =
mi∑
j=1
bij . (2)
3) Price (pi): It is defined as the price that an operator i has
to pay, in case operator i wins the resources (channels),
else it would be zero.
4) Operator Utility (Ui) : Utility of an operator i is the
difference between the operator valuation (unknown to
the auctioneer) and the price charged on the allocation
of the channel. If the operator does not get the channel,
the utility would be zero. In other words, it gives the
overall gain of an operator if it is allocated channels.
Ui(bi, b−i) =
{
σvi − pi if the channel is allocated
0 otherwise.
.
(3)
where, bi is the bid vector of operator i and b−i bid vectors
of other operators except i.
Definition 1. An auction is truthful (strategy-proof) if there
is no incentive in deviating from the true valuation. Thus, the
dominant strategy is to bid at the true valuation no matter
what strategy others are choosing.
Ui(bi, b−i) ≤ Ui(vi, b−i) ∀bi,&b−i. (4)
where, vi is the vector of true valuations at the base stations
of an operator i.
III. MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, we describe the mechanism design for
channel allocation among the base stations of multiple op-
erators. Recall the assumptions made in previous sections,
multiple base stations correspond to an operator and one
channel availability. In auctions, the mechanism design has
two steps: channel allocation and price charging strategy. In
channel allocation auctioneer decides whom the right to use
the channel is provided, and what price should be charged
is decided in pricing strategy. The price charged enforces the
operators to declare the true valuation to ensure strategy-proof
auction. Now, we define critical operator which is used later
in the price charging strategy.
Definition 2. A critical operator C(i) of an operator i is
defined as the operator in Ni, whose sum of bids is maximum
among all the operators in Ni except i.
C(i) =
{
j ∈ Oi|
∑
k∈{Ni
⋂
Sj}
bjk ≥
∑
k∈{Ni
⋂
S′j}
bj′k,
∀j′ 6= j, i &j′ ∈ Oi
}
.
(5)
Let us define a set Lik = Ni ∩ Sk, which contains the base
stations of operator k in conflict with the base stations of the
operator i. Let Λik be the valuation of set Lik which is given as,
Λik =
∑
bkj1{Skj∈Lik}. The critical operator of an operator i
can be obtained as, C(i) = arg max
k 6=i
Λik, k ∈ Oi and the
critical operator valuation σci is given as, σ
c
i = max
k 6=i
Λik, k ∈
Oi.
The strategy-proof algorithm proposed is described in Al-
gorithm 1. This algorithm takes conflict graph G and bid
vector corresponding to each operator {bi}{i∈N}. Binary
channel allocation vector {Xi}{i∈N} and the payment vector
{pi}{i∈N} for all the operators are initialized to zero. Algo-
rithm starts with determining the maximum bidding operator
and its critical neighbor C(i∗) = arg max
k 6=i
Λi
∗
k , k ∈ Oi∗.
Algorithm 1 Strategy-proof auction mechanism
1: Input: Conflict Graph G, bid vector, {~bi}{i∈N}.
2: Output: Binary channel allocation vector {Xi}{i∈N},
payment {pi}{i∈N}.
3: Initialize vector Xi ← ~0, N(G) = {1, 2, . . . , N}
4: Initialize pi ← 0, G′ ← G, N(G′) = N(G), FLAG =
True.
5: while (FLAG = True) do
6: Calculate i∗ = arg max
{i∈N(G′ )}
σbi .
7: Find Ni∗ .
8: Calculate C(i∗) = arg max
k 6=i∗
Λi
∗
k , k ∈ Oi∗ and σci∗ =
max
k 6=i∗
Λi
∗
k k ∈ Oi∗.
9: Make pi∗ ← σci∗ and Make Xi∗ ← 1.
10: if (G′ ∩ (Si∗ ∪Ni∗) = G′) then
11: FLAG← False.
12: else
13: G′ ← G′\{Si∗ ∪Ni∗}.
14: end if
15: end while
A1 A2
A3
B1 B2 B3C1
C2
C3
Operator A
Operator B 
Operator C
(a)
1 2 3 Total
operator A 8 10 7 25
operator B 9 8 5 22
operator C 9 9 3 21
(b)
Fig. 2: Network of 3 operators (a) Conflict Graph (b) Bid
vector table corresponding to operator A, B and C.
Channel allocation vector, {Xi} for the maximum bidding
operator (winner) is updated to 1 and the payment for the
winning operator is updated to the price of the critical neighbor
valuation, σci∗ . The conflict graph G
′
is updated with the
remaining nodes after the removal of the nodes corresponding
to the winning operator i∗ and its neighboring nodes Ni∗ .
Repeat the process until G′ is NULL.
Example: Consider a network of 3 operators A,B,C,
where each operator has 3 base stations deployed in the
region to provide services to the subscribers. The base stations
A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3 and C1, C2, C3 correspond to the
operators A, B and C respectively. Conflict graph is illustrated
in the Figure 2a based on the interference criteria.
In the table of Figure 2b, bid vector of each operator is
presented. Operator A has the highest bid value of σbA = 25.
Therefore, Operator A will get channel at its base stations
and it has to pay the price of its critical operator. As per
the Definition (2), critical operator for winning operator A is
operator C and pA = σcA = 18. Thus, the utility of operator
A, UA = 7. Update the conflict graph with the base stations
of operator B and C not in conflict with base stations of
operator A. In second iteration, the updated G comprises of
base stations B3 and C3. Operator B wins the channel and
pays the price, σcB = 3. The utility of operator B is 2. Operator
C does not get channel.
Now, if Operator B tries to increase its utility by deviating
from its true valuation σvB = 22 to σ
b
B = 28 by increasing the
bid of its base stations. Operator B will get channel being the
highest bidder among the operators. But, it has to pay the price
of its critical operator which is operator A and pays σcB = 25.
This leads to negative utility −3, for operator B. Thus, bidding
at true valuation is the best strategy for an operator in the
auction. Next, we prove that the proposed algorithm follows
monotonicity and strategy-proofness.
Lemma 1. If any operator i is allocated a channel by bidding
at σbi , it will also be allocated if it bids σ
b′
i , where σ
b′
i ≥ σbi
provided all the other operators bids remain unchanged.
Proof. As stated in the algorithm, all the operator bids are
arranged in non-increasing order of the bids σbi ,∀i ∈ N . Let
us assume in the sorted list S operator i lies at position k.
Now, keeping all the other operator bids unchanged, increase
the bid of operator i to σb
′
i , and again arrange all the operator
bids in non-increasing order in another sorted list S′. Let us
say, the position of operator i in S′ is l, where l ≤ k. Thus,
the operator moves higher in the position which ensures it still
receives the channel. This completes the proof.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is strategy-proof.
Proof. To show the strategy-proofness of the algorithm, pos-
sible scenarios can be divided into two categories:
Scenario 1 : Any operator i tries to deviate from truthfulness
by bidding greater than the true valuation i.e, σbi > σ
v
i .
Case (i): An operator i does not win channel even after
bidding untruthfully at σbi , greater than σ
v
i . Hence, it
will have utility, Ui = 0.
Case (ii): An operator i wins channel at its bidding
valuation, σbi (which is greater than the true valuation) as
well as its true valuation, σvi . It will have positive utility,
Ui = σvi − pi, which is same as in case operator bids
at the true valuation. Thus, bidding at higher valuation
does not lead to any extra incentive.
Case (iii): An operator wins channel at σbi , but looses
at σvi . Though the operator has been allocated channel
by bidding untruthfully at higher value but it has to pay
the price of its critical neighbor which is greater than
the price of its true valuation (from the Algorithm 1).
Ui = σvi − pi,
= σvi − σci where pi = σci ,
≤ 0. ∵ σvi < σci .
Scenario 2 : An operator i tries to deviate from truthfulness
by bidding less than the true valuation i.e, σbi < σ
v
i .
Case (i): Operator i looses channel at σbi as well as its
true valuation, σvi . Thus, it will have Ui = 0.
Case (ii): Operator i wins channel at σbi as well as
its true valuation, σvi which follows from monotonicity.
Thus, it will have Ui = σvi − pi.
Case (iii) : Operator looses at σbi , but wins bidding at σ
v
i .
Thus, the operator is at loss by deviating to untruthful
value with zero utility. But, bidding truthfully at σvi
result in the channel allocation, with utility Ui = σvi −pi.
From the above scenarios, it can be seen that bidding at σbi 6=
σvi , does not improve the utility of operator. Thus, σ
b
i = σ
v
i is
the weakly dominant strategy for any operator. This completes
the proof.
IV. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the computational complexity of
the proposed algorithm. Computational complexity analysis of
the proposed algorithm in case of n operators and a single
channel available for allocation among the base stations of the
operators in the region with given conflict graph G = (V, E)
is as follows.
The overall complexity of the proposed algorithm can be
performed in two steps, channel allocation and price charging
computation from the winning operator. The algorithm takes
O(n) time to obtain the maximum bidding operator and
allocates the channel among its base stations.
To calculate the price charged by the winning operator,
algorithm needs to examine the conflicting neighbors corre-
sponding to the base stations of winning operator. In any
graph G = (V, E), complexity of determining the conflicting
nodes is given by O(|V | + |E|), where V is the number of
vertices (nodes) and E corresponds to number of edges in
the graph. The edges in a graph with V nodes is bounded
as E ≤ V (V−1)2 . Let us assume ith operator has mi base
stations and the total number of base stations is obtained as
m =
∑
i∈N mi. Since, the base stations of the same operator
are not in conflict with each other, the winning operator i can
conflict with maximum of remaining m − mi base stations
of the given conflict graph. Therefore, the complexity of
determining critical neighbor is O(mi + (m−mi)(m−mi−1)2 ).
The term m−mi in the complexity of critical neighbor will
keep on decreasing over the iterations, as the number of base
stations allocated channel would increase. Thus, the complex-
ity of critical neighbor evaluation is O(mi + (m−mi)2). On
simplification, this is approximately O(m2). The complexity
of algorithm for an iteration (channel allocation and price
charging) is O(n + m2). Therefore, the overall complexity
of the algorithm is O(n(n+m2)), where n is the number of
operators and m is the total number of base stations in the
given region. As the number of base stations is much larger
than the number of operators, the overall complexity of the
algorithm can be approximated as O(nm2).
The computational complexity of (VCG) [3]–[5] mechanism
for optimal channel allocation is given by O(2m − 1), where
m denotes the total number of base stations across all the
operators. Similarly, the computational complexity of the price
charging mechanism is O(m(2m−1)). However, the proposed
algorithm has overall complexity O(nm2), which makes it
efficient and feasible even for large set of base stations of the
operators.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed
algorithm with that of the VCG mechanism. The simulations
are performed in MATLAB [12]. As discussed in Section II
the system model has multiple operators in the region bidding
for its base stations. In Figure 3, simulations results for three
operator scenario is compared with those of the classical VCG
algorithm for the following parameters:
• Allocation Efficiency: It is defined as the total number
of base stations which are assigned channels across all
the operators i.e.,
∑
i∈N
xi, where xi denotes the allocation
vector of operator i.
• Social Welfare: Social welfare is defined as the sum of
the bids corresponding to the base stations which are
allocated channels.
We consider LTE base stations of all the operators are
uniformly distributed across the region with one channel
availability in spectrum database. From the distribution, G
is generated. VCG mechanism computes the sets of feasible
outcomes, Ω which comprises of all the independent set from
the graph. Based on the bids, the set of all the weighted
independent feasible outcomes is obtained and then the the
maximum weighted independent set is chosen.
It has been observed from the Figure 3 that the allocation
efficiency (number of base stations that are allocated channels)
and the social welfare is near to the optimal value obtained
from the VCG mechanism. The reduced complexity of the
proposed algorithm makes it suitable for the spectrum alloca-
tion among the large set of base stations of multiple operators.
Thus, auction can be performed in short durations based on
the dynamic load variation in the network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we study the problem of spectrum allocation
in multi-parameter environment and propose an algorithm
for spectrum allocation among the multiple base stations of
multiple operators. We prove that the proposed algorithm
guarantees strategy-proofness. We also present computational
complexity of the proposed algorithm and prove that the
proposed algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time
O(nm2), where n is number of operators and m represents the
total number of base stations across all the operators. Thus, the
proposed algorithm is feasible for practical implementation in
real time spectrum auctions. Using simulation results, we ob-
serve that the performance of the proposed algorithm is near-
optimal in terms of allocation efficiency and social welfare,
and it solves the intractability issue of VCG mechanism.
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